In pursuit of renewable hydro-power, China has constructed more than 87,000 dams at a rate unmatched in human history. Collectively, they generate 352 gigawatts of electricity, which is more than the capacities of Brazil, Canada and the United States combined. Now, however, after damming most of its internal rivers, China is looking to dam the major international rivers flowing out from Tibet. Nearly half of the world's human population depends on the Tibetan rivers and as China taps into the water supply, it is increasingly able to take the terms to the downstream periphery.
Widely known as the water tower of Asia,The Tibetan Plateau is a rich repository of fresh water that is shared across Asia. It is the source of water for a dozen transboundary rivers, including the Yangtze, yellow, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra. Irrawaddy, Salween and Mekong rivers. Collectively, more than 3 billion people depend on these rivers. Just take a moment to appreciate this geopolitical fact of existence. The slightest alteration in water flow could ignite a chain of environmental refugees in some of the most densely populated nations in the world. Much of the fresh water in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam trace its origins to the glaciers in Tibet and through its political control over Tibet, China has total upper riparian control over the downstream nations. This makes Tibet China's greatest geographic advantage, deeply so and China isn't shy about the exploitation of hydropower. It spent over seven decades damming most of its internal waterways and in the process displaced more than 23 million people from their homes and land. The price for development has been heavy, but the hydropower sector has grown 20 fold in the last 40 years. Still Chinese lawmakers are only getting started. After damming most of its rivers China is now casting its site on the major trans-boundary rivers flowing out from the Tibetan Plateau, which had thus far remained largely untouched. Today, less than 1% of Tibet's hydropower potential is being exploited but that condition is changing as urbanization and industrialization across China accelerates Beijing's need for renewable energy is increasing rapidly. As such, state owned companies are now lobbying the Beijing government to approve of hydropower projects in Tibet with 28 project currently waiting for the green light. Some facilities along Tibet's transboundary rivers have already been realized and they offer a peek into the future.
The Brahmaputra for instance, is a major international river shared by China, India and Bangladesh. It stretches over a total length of 2900 kilometers starting on the Tibetan Plateau from its source to glacier near Mount Kailash, an area that is considered sacred by multiple religions. There was a time that the river was free from human engineering, but today it is dammed on every section. Starting from the Zangbo hydroelectric facility. There is a cascade of construction projects along with the Brahmaputra. They represent the future of Tibet river systems. In 2013, when China approved of three new projects on the Brahmaputra River downstream India raised concerns on the flow of water. Chinese lawmakers then claimed that the dams would be run off river hydroelectric facilities which is a type of plant absent of a large reservoir and is widely used among international rivers, especially in South and Southeast Asia. Energy is harvested by diverting part of the river to run past Electricity Generating turbines. The water that comes out then flows back to join the river it sounds reassuring because in theory, such a system will have little impact downstream. Except that is not how the power grid works. Too much electricity generation can overload the grid and run of river facilities usually store a large volumes of water during the day and then release it for electricity generation during peak energy demand in the evening. So by manipulating the daily fluctuations, there is a clear downstream consequence.The three Chinese dams on the Brahmaputra mark as the opening salvo in a long line of projects to come, Beijing plans to construct a dozen hydropower plants on the river and several more on its tributaries. As these dams become operational, the altered water flow will damage agriculture, ecology and upset the lives of 1.3 billion people in Downstream India and Bangladesh. Of course, downstream India has raised the issue of Chinese hydropower facilities numerous times and Indian lawmakers often point out to the memorandum of understanding between China and India regarding the water resources of transboundary rivers. The trouble is that the bilateral understanding is non binding and without an international body that ensures its application. In fact, from a legal standpoint, there is no official agreement between China and any of the downstream countries of the use of shared river systems. The closest Beijing ever came to participate in multilateral transboundary water governance was in 1995. The nations adjacent to the Mekong proclaimed that the river belongs to no single state ,with the goal being to develop sustainable projects along its watershed. Downstream Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam signed the agreement, but China refused to join at the last moment. Instead, Beijing claimed to reserves the right to exercise its territorial jurisdiction. In 1987. There was another attempt to lay down some legal rules during the United Nations watercourse Convention, which sought to create an international agreement on the governance of transboundary rivers. China voted against it. These diplomatic episodes occurred at a time when Beijing was still relatively poor. At the time in 1997, Hong Kong's economy was more than 18% the size of the economy of mainland China, the Beijing of the past did not have the economic capacity nor the political confidence of today. Therefore drafting a legal bill today to govern transboundary Tibetan Rivers has no chance of success. This legal story or lack of it explains India's predicament. And when even India is incapable of halting Chinese engineering, one can imagine the political tantrum in the other downstream nations. Rapid population growth, urbanization, industrialization and climate change threatened water security across South and Southeast Asia.
As China rolls out its hydropower policy for Tibet water scarcity will become an authentic policy issue for the downstream nations. There are a multitude of reasons that explain the stress of water scarcity by 2050. It is expected that the annual rate of glacial melt in Tibet will decline by two thirds as a result of climate change. The alteration will affect each transboundary river system differently. Some rivers will see a stronger water flow while others will diminish leaving millions of people at risk from either flooding or Drought. This environmental change will come at a time when population growth in South and Southeast Asia is set to peak by 2050. The population of South Asia will grow from the present 1.9 billion to nearly 2.4 billion. In the same timeframe, Southeast Asia will grow from 662 million to 794 million. China's population will remain stable at 1.4 billion. Even more pressing urbanization in China is taking place at an unprecedented rate. In 1978, about 18% of Chinese citizens lived in urban areas, by 2017 that number eclipsed 58%. At this rate, China's urban population will hit the 1 billion mark by 2030. More people in the cities will increase the demand for water within China. So population growth in Asia and urbanization in China will demand more resources. At a certain point, there will not be enough water to go around.
Still worse. Since the 1950s. Beijing has been reforest the large areas in Tibet, normally converting barren lands to forests as a commendable action.The soil conditions improve the area's purified and the wildlife gets a second chance. As a result of increased vegetation. Irrigated agriculture has become the new normal in Tibet. In fact, irrigation practices currently the biggest consumer of water in the Tibetan plateau with almost 40% of the land under irrigation. This sounds harmless on the surface, but it means that the growing reach of vegetation and irrigated agriculture is not competing with human consumption for water. These activities place additional stress on the supply of water in downstream communities. By 2025. The United Nations predicts that water scarcity will affect 1.8 billion people. Asia will be hit particularly bad as the locals will face water stress or outright shortages. China's control over Tibet places it in a dominant position to control Asia's water resources. That leverage can be used as a political weapon to steer the foreign policies of its smaller neighbors, for instance, along the Mekong River in Tibet, China has constructed seven dams and plans to build 21 more. The Mekong is the lifeline of some 60 million people spread over Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Any alteration to its water flow could have downstream consequences, which could harm livestock harvest, agricultural yield, freshwater availability, etc. People living below the poverty line will bear the brunt of the situation. Meanwhile, along the Salween river, China has constructed a mega dam, located a few kilometers away from a UNESCO World Heritage site. More dams are in the work and they pose a risk to downstream Myanmar. The concern is that if more dams are constructed along the Salween in Tibet, sea water would intrude into Myanmar, and destroyed large patchworks of farmland as well as flood hundreds of settlements yet of all the downstream nations.
Bangladesh is on the worst receiving end. The Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers merge in Bangladesh and then flow into the Bay of Bengal, India, however, is pursuing its own hydropower policy along the Ganges River. Indian dams have reduced water flow in Downstream Bangladesh. As a result, soil salinity in Bangladesh is destroying farmlands and forcing thousands of Bangladeshis to relocate to the northeast into India, in turn this produces ethno religious conflict. Bangladeshi lawmakers have no leverage on either China or India, nor do they have the capacity to search for alternative solutions while dealing with the hydropower policy of its upstream neighbors. Bangladesh must also deal with rising sea levels as well as the flow of refugees coming in from neighboring Myanmar consequent of the ongoing ethnic cleansing there. If ever there was a lose lose situation, one might find it in Bangladesh.
As the number of Chinese dams in Tibet decreases water scarcity will become a nightmare policy issue for the downstream countries. The concern is that in the future when China has fully realized the hydropower potential of Tibet, it could use the flow of water as a political weapon to extract geopolitical concessions. At the flick of a switch China could flood some areas while leaving other places in the dry. How Beijing chooses to apply that pressure is at its own discretion because there are no legal restrictions. With such detrimental effects downstream, one might be inclined to believe that opposition to Chinese dams is universal. But that's just not the case. Thailand has a deal with China where it buys thousands of megawatts of electricity. Cambodia and Laos retain passive attitudes because they prioritize their economic interaction with China over transboundary river negotiations. Pakistan enjoys a special relationship with China and Beijing has thus far not announced any dams, plants or hydropower facilities that would harm the water flow of its downstream ally. So opposition to Chinese dams is not universal. And unless that narrative changes, unless the downstream nations across South and Southeast Asia unify in opposition against mega dams on Transboundary rivers, China will gradually subdue its periphery and Tibet, the water tower of Asia sits at the epicenter of Beijing's quest for hegemony
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